Bottom of the ninth. Two outs. The bases are loaded. The Giants are down by three. J.T. Snow steps to the plate. Fans roar in the packed stadium. Maddox winds and throws. Snow swings, and misses. Strike one. Sweat soaks hats and uniforms in the thick evening air. The second pitch catches the bottom corner of the strike zone. Strike two. Snow taps the bat against his cleats and glances nervously at the dugout. Coach Baker bellows up to him, “Mind over matter, J.T. Hit the cove.”

This could be the play of the year, but, for a moment, we will pause the game and examine the situation. Baker has suggested that Snow can use his mind to influence his performance, but what is the reality of the situation? Does Snow truly have a mind that can influence the matter of his body? What is the nature of this mind: is it matter itself and part of the body, or is it some other substance separate from the body? These questions, collectively known as the mind/body problem, have perplexed even the greatest thinkers since ancient times. René Descartes, a 17th century philosopher, proposes dualism as a solution. Dualism states that the mind is immaterial—a substance other than matter—and is distinct from the material body. In opposition, John Searle, our contemporary, proposes monism: the mind and body are one substance—matter. The arguments of Descartes rely on a mental self-analysis of the problem, and Searle works with scientific findings. I find myself agreeing with Descartes’ introspective approach.

In Descartes introspection, found in Meditations on First Philosophy, he arrives at several conclusions that provide the foundation for his dualism. The first of these is the infamous “I think, therefore I am”, in which Descartes realizes his existence—“I am”—, and his essence as a thinking being—“I think”. From there, he concludes that God and reality also exist, and that what he clearly and distinctly perceives is true. This last conclusion is fundamental to Descartes’ dualism: he proposes that he can clearly and distinctly perceive a mind, his self, which is independent of his perceived body. He contrasts these separate perceptions, and claims that the differences are grounds for dualism. The mind, to Descartes, is an indivisible substance: mental processes, such as willing, sensing, and understanding, cannot be separated from one another. A body, however, is clearly divisible into many parts. Descartes claims that some mental processes actually are parts of the body: sensation and imagination, for example, can be attributed to the mechanics of the nervous system, in which sensory inputs are either received (sensation) or recalled (imagination). The processes of understanding and willing, however, are dependent on the mind. The self, or mind, can be perceived without the body and the thought that occurs there—sensation, imagination, etc.—, but it cannot be perceived without understanding and willing—those processes fundamental to the mind. Descartes also notices the body’s independence from the mind’s will, as when dreams occur without the mind’s consent. Descartes proposes that the mind and body exist in a close relationship that accounts for the mind’s ability, for example, to recognize the bodily sensation of hunger and act upon it. Thus, Descartes’ dualism relies on the clear and distinct perception of the mind separate from and in contrast to the body.

John Searle does not disagree with Descartes’ view of the mind being central to existence—“I think, therefore I am”—, but claims that the mind is a result of bodily processes and is not the independent substance Descartes describes. The result of millions of neurons acting in conjunction provides the physical reality that makes up the mind, although each neuron itself only relays tiny bits of electricity. To explain this theory, Searle creates an analogy between the brain and a physical environment, such as a volume of water. Each molecule of water, H2O, only interacts on a microscopic level to move, collide, and bond with other molecules, etc. The volume of water on a macro-level scale, has the properties of temperature, wetness, liquidity, etc. that are nonexistent at the micro-level. In the same manner, Searle claims, the neurons and other pieces composing the nervous system are micro-level causes of the macro-level properties of the mind, such as imagination and consciousness. Scientific research has found evidence that physical brain activity does exist during thought processes, which supports the idea that the mind is material. Dualism, as Descartes describes, requires an extraordinary connection between the mind and the brain to allow the immaterial mind to cause physical brain activity; Searle’s monism avoids this problem by stating that the mind is inherently found in the physical brain. Thus, using an objective, scientific method, Searle concludes that the mind/body problem is nonexistent, and his monism is analogous to physical systems that combine micro-level components to cause macro-level properties.

Comparison of the human brain to physical systems is an ingenious approach to the mind/body problem. Biological systems, such as cells composing organs, also have micro-level components that create macro-level properties, and it follows that the neurons in the brain cause various sensations, emotions, images, memories, understanding, and consciousness. Despite these system-level properties of the brain/mind, I believe that self-awareness and free will, two related abilities, cannot be described as the result of micro-level elements. Free will requires an understanding of options available to a person; this is found in self-awareness. Self-awareness is the understanding of macro-level systems in the brain—sensation, imagination, consciousness, etc.—in their relation to one another. Our clear and distinct perception of free will, which both Descartes and Searle recognize, is not possible under the material, monist view that Searle proposes. This view portrays the mind as a system of physical reactions in the brain that are caused only by other physical reactions, not by an independent free will. The logical conclusion, then, is that free will exists in an immaterial mind, separate from the body; and Searle’s analogy is false with regards to free will. Because free will is possible only in combination with self-awareness, self-awareness must also reside in the mind; the reactions among neurons of the brain account for other thought processes. Also, the introspective perception of the mind separate from the body is clear to me. The extraordinary connection this dualism requires between the mind and the brain is quite plausible: new research into the nature of our universe is always revealing new substances, such as anti-matter or dark matter, that physically affect our reality and could determine the fiber of the mind.

Two substances, one material and one immaterial, are thus composing humans. René Descartes acknowledges this dualism by perceiving the mind separate from the body. John Searle argues for a monism that cannot account for free will or self-awareness. Free will and self-awareness must exist, and so, therefore, must the clearly perceived immaterial mind. Accordingly, mind and matter are distinct substances. Now, back to the game:

J.T. Snow wills himself to become aware of the ball in the pitcher’s hand. It is flung from the mound and slices through the air toward him. Snow focuses on the blur and whirls his bat across the plate, connecting solidly with the ball. It sails over the infield and arcs above the outfield, thudding into the glove of a boy in the third row. The crowd screams cheers onto the field. Victory!